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The Dynamics of Negative Political Advertising:
History, Thematic Designs, and Effectiveness
by
Erik J. Bolinder

During the last decade, political observers have marked a trend in political advenising
toward more negative attacks on opponents. Many ofthese attacks have been criticized as untrue,
unfair, and sometimes unethical. Many journalists have staned analyzing the advenising campaigns
as much as the candidates themselves. Major newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and
Washington Post have devoted daily columns to the analysis of negative political advenisements
during a campaign. This repon examines the dynamics of negative political advenisements by
exploring their history, thematic designs, and effects on voting behavior. Although most political
expens agree that negative political advenisements may be an effective tool in winning votes for
the sponsor, the reverse, or the boomerang effect, is possible. This repon also demonstrates the
possibility of such an occurence by examining negative political campaigning in the 1990 race
for Congress in Utah's third congressional district.
Introduction
Throughout our nation's history ,
politicians have often engaged in negative
political campaigning. Even the respected and
highly revered George Washington was
attacked and distressed by stories that he was
a dolt, a thief, and a philanderer who offered
his beautiful slave woman to Mount Vernon's
VISItors. Upon winning the race for the
presidency and entering the White House,
Thomas Jefferson said, "I am the target of
every man's dirt" (Pfau and Kenski 1990, 5).
The emergence of newspapers in the
late 18th century--some owned and operated
by political party leaders themselves, and most
openly endorsing specific political views-fueled the development of negative political
campaigning. The newspapers became the
"voices of the political party that controlled
them " (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland 1991, 4).
Abraham Lincoln was attacked in his campaigns as an ape and depicted in political
cartoons as a clown and a fiend. During the
1884 presidential campaign, Grover Cleveland
survived vicious newspaper attacks and

political cartoons that claimed he fathered an
illegitimate child (Pfau and Kenski 1990, 5).
The development of electronic media
in the 20th century raised the level of negative
political advertising to a new high. Radio and
television opened up a new and larger audience
for candidates, especially on a national level.
As Pfau and Kenski point out, "those new
channels of communication were viewed as
more potent vehicles for political persuasion
and for transmitting negative messages" (1990,
6).
The first television campaign advertisements were aired during the 1952 presidential campaign.
A Madison Avenue
marketing consultant, Rosser Reeves, produced
commercials for Eisenhower and the Republican Party. Reeves, already well known for
his success in selling Anacin and M&M
chocolates through television commercials,
used the same principles that worked so well
for those products to sell Eisenhower as a
candidate. Reeves narrowed the campaign
to three major themes: the Korean War,
corruption, and rising taxes. Just as he stuck
to simple themes in his product commercials,
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Reeves had Eisenhower recite simple statements centered around one of the three themes
for each commercial (Diamond and Bates
1988, 56).
During the early years of television,
few negative political advertisements were
featured. However, the Eisenhower campaign
aired one of the first: an antiwar statement.
"Two soldiers are pictured discussing the
meaningless [sic] of war on a Korean battlefield, and when one is suddenly killed, the
other futilely charges the enemy while an offcamera voice booms, 'vote Republican!'"
(Sabato 1981, 169). Negative advertisements
became far more institutionalized on television
during the 1964 presidential campaign:

the boomerang effect resulting from negative
political campaigns by examining the impact
of negative campaigning on the 1990 race for
congress in Utah's third congressional district.

Definitions
An understanding of the term "political
advertisement" in the context of this discussion
is important. A political advertisement may
be defined as a message supporting a candidate
or issue that has been paid for by the campaign
or supporters of the candidate or issue.
Political advertising generally falls into the
following four basic categories:
1.

It produced the most famous, and possibly the
most effective, negative political commercial
ever shown, a message that was so controversial
that the Johnson campaign pulled it after one
showing. The so-called 'daisy' spot...introduced
the sights and sounds of spring surrounding a
little girl picking flowers. It ends with a vivid
nuclear explosion as President Johnson intones
off camera about the stakes in the presidential
election (pfau and Kenski 1990, 7).

Today, negative political advertising
has become commonplace among local, state,
and federal campaigns. Estimating that a third
of all television spot commercials in recent
campaigns have been negative, Sabato says
increased negative advertising is the single
most obvious trend in campaign communication
(1981, 165). Over 450 million dollars were
spent in the 1986 House and Senate races and
over 50 percent of that amount was on negative
political advertising (Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991, 3). To understand why this
proliferation of negative political advertisements is occurring, one must look at the
dynamics of today's negative political ads.
This report will discuss the thematic designs
and use of negative political advertisements,
examine the effectiveness of negative ads on
voting behavior, and study the possibility of

2.

3.

4.

Polispots - Television and radio commercials that run from 1 to 5 minutes
in length.
Newspaper Ads - These range from
tiny classified in rural weeklies to full
page displays in big city dailies.
Direct Mail - Mass mailings of computer generated letters carefully targeted to prospective voters.
Vertical Media - This is campaign
paraphernalia like bumper stickers,
buttons, yard signs, banners, key
chains (Young 1987,66).

Most of the research used in this report
focusses on the analysis of the first category:
polispots.
The term "negative political advertisement" should also be defined. Kaid and
Johnston offer an appropriate definition:
Negative ads and positive ads are generally
distinguished by their relative emphasis on the
sponsoring candidate and his or her opponent.
Negative ads focus on criticism of the opponent.
while positive ads focus on the 'good' characteristics, accomplishments, or issue positions
of the sponsoring candidate (Kaid and Johnston
1991, 53).
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Thematic Designs
The negative political advertisements
of today have increased in complexity and
sophistication from just three decades ago.
As shown in Table 1, Johnson-Cartee and
Copeland identify a number of standardizedthematic designs that have emerged in negative

political campaigns (1991, 72). Five overarching thematic designs are considered: being
your own worst enemy, the people against you,
transfer, us against them, and disparagement
humor. A variety of subcategories are also
listed.

Thematic Designs of Negative Advertisements
Being Your own worst Enemy
Your Ad in Their Negative spots
Your Political Gaffes
Your Political Experience
Your Political Character
Your Flip-Flops on the Issues
Your Past Promises and pitiful Performances
Your Voting Record (Actual Voting or Whether You Voted)
Your Choice for Vice President
Your Decision Not to Debate
The People Against You
The Voters Turn Against You
The Home constituency Turns Against You
The Party Faithful Reject You
Your Own Party Primary opponents Attack You
Transfer
Your comrades and Supporters
Events that Happened on Your Watch
Historical Comparisons
Paid Political Help
Os Against Them
The Cowboys vs. The Yankees
Us Against Foreigners
Class Warfare
The anti-Washington Mentality
Disparagement Humor
Source: Johnson-Cartee, Karen 5., and Gary A. Copeland. 1991. Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
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Being Your Own Worst Enemy. Sometimes
political candidates become their own worst
enemies when their opponents use their past
performances or words against
them. A candidate's record, character, and
important decisions often become the targets
of attack. Even the lack of a past performance
becomes suspect. A candidate is sometimes
criticized for the fact that he or she has little
political experience for the office he or she
is seeking.

The People Against You. From time to time
almost every candidate will encounter a degree
of rejection from those perceived to be on the
same side of the fence--usually the same
political party or the same geographic area.
Attack statements made by opposing candidates
in the same party during primary campaigns
are often used against a candidate. Negative
statements may also be made by those living
in the same hometown or state as the candidate. An opposing candidate will sometimes
capitalize on this rejection and attempt to make
it look like even the opponent's closest allies
are turning against him or her.
Transfer. The character of a candidate's
supporters may sometimes be a liability. If
groups or individuals who are unpopular or
have unaccepted views support a specific
candidate, this fact may be used against that
candidate as an attack on the candidate's own
views or character. This technique is called
transfer. This approach may also be used to
tie the candidate to a negative event that
occurred during his or her term in office like
a depression, a war, or an outbreak of civil
unrest even though the candidate may not be
specifically responsible. Furthermore, if a
candidate resembles an unpopular personality
from our history, an historical comparison may
also be made.

Us Against Them. The us against them
approach may often be compared to the David
and Goliath story. A picture is often painted
of a candidate siding with an immense,
threatening bully from the outside. Perhaps
this is most often accomplished by painting
the opponent as a Washington insider with big
bucks who cares more about his or her status
inside the beltway rather than the welfare of
the people back home. This approach sometimes pits the working class against the upper
class or rural folks against "city slickers."
In industrialized areas like Michigan or Ohio,
candidates have used their opponents' relationships with foreign industrialized countries like
Japan as a threat to their own security and
well-being. The us against them approach
always depicts one candidate as the home team
(and often the underdog) and the opposing
candidate as the outsider.
Disparagement Humor. A candidate may
use humor to attack his or her opponent's
intelligence, voting record, or honesty.
Disparagement humor is defined as humor that
"disparages, belittles, debases, demeans,
humiliates, or otherwise victimizes" others
(Johnson-Cartee and Copeland 1991, 122).
Disparagement humor has a long history in
American politics stemming back to early
political cartoons depicting candidates with
exaggerated distinguishing physical characteristics. Research indicates that the most popular
strategy in negative ads appears to be humor
or ridicule (Kaid and Johnston 1991, 60) often
combined with another thematic design.
Usin& Ne&ative Advertisements
A basic understanding of how negative
political advertisements are designed leads to
two more important questions: when are they
used and who uses them the most? Kaid and
Johnston analyzed 830 television spots from
eight presidential campaigns to examine the
answers to these questions. Findings from
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their study dispel some of the conceptions of
the use of negative advertisements.
Although many have charged that
negativism drastically increased during the
1988 election cycle, Kaid and Johnston found
that the level of negative advertisements in
1988 was the same as that of the two previous
years (1991, 57). As shown in Figure 1, the
1964 election year still holds the record for
the amount of televised negative advertisements. After that year, a steady increase over
time in negative advertising has taken place.

Kaid and Johnston also found that
neither incumbents nor challengers have a
monopoly on the use of negative political
advertisements (1991, 58). As shown in Figure 2, the use of negative political ads are very
similar between these two groups.
Sometimes one political party will
blame the other for excessively using negative
advertisements. Kaid and Johnston found that
no strong relationship exists between political
party and the use of negative ads (1991,58).
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As shown in Figure 3, Democrats have used
only slightly more negative political ads than
Republicans.
Kaid and Johnston also studied the
difference between the appeals of negative and
positive advertisements (1991, 59). They
found that, contrary to critical opinion,
negative ads did not rely much more on
emotional appeals than positive ads. As shown
in Table 2, emotional appeals were used in
89 percent of all negative ads and in 86 percent
of all positive ads. Additionally,

negative ads contained logical appeals more
often than positive ads, but positive ads were
more likely than negative ads to use ethical
appeals.
The Effectiveness of Negative Ads
Determining the effectiveness of
negative political advertising on voting
behavior is hindered by the limitations of
studying the effects of political advertising

Figure 2
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in general. Because so much simultaneous
activity occurs during a campaign, it has been
difficult to isolate the effectiveness of one
specific activity like political advertising. The
effectiveness of political advertising on
television is still largely undetermined:
Kay Israel did a 1983 study of the existing
academic literature on political advertising and
found little that went beyond the standard
textbook conclusion offered by Bernard Berelson
of the University of Chicago in the pre-

television 1940s. Berelson wrote that 'some kinds of
communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the
attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of
conditions, have some kinds of effects.' For this cautious
adagio we are tempted to say to Berelson, 'Thanks a little'
(Diamond and Bates 1988, 351).

More conclusive research suggests that
people pay attention principally to messages
that reflect their preexisting views (Diamond
and Bates 1988, 351). For example, those
who have already chosen to vote for Bush are
the most attentive audience for Bush campaign

Figure 3
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ads. Conversely, those who oppose Bush are
less attentive to a Bush ad or will listen to the
ad, argue with it in their minds, and then reject
it.
In the case of political campaigns, the
"some kind of people" (as previously mentioned by Diamond and Bates) the experts say
they are trying to reach are those who are not
highly partisan or who have not decided on
a candidate:

partisan individuals are best reached by direct mail or
limited circulation print advertising, whereas television
ads are most effective with the body of the U.S. electorate
who are not partisan and are thus persuadable (Kern 1989,
6).

Perhaps politicians are addicted to using
television advertising in campaigns because
it enables them to reach thousands and even
millions more people than they otherwise
could. But why use negative messages? As
Ehrenhalt indicates, although the effectiveness
of political advertising in general is still

Campaign specialists function on the basis of
their research, which suggests that highly

TABLE 2
Appeals in Positive and Negative Televised Ads for Presidential Campaigns, 1960-1988
Positive Ads
(n=588)
Appeals Used
Logical
Emotional
Ethical

n
391
507
438

%
66
86
74

Negative Ads
(n = 242)
n
175
215
135

%
72
89
56

Source: Lynda L. Kaid and Anne Johnston. 1991. "Negative Versus Positive Advertising in U.S. Presidential
Campaigns: 1960-1988. Journal of Communication 41 (Summer): 53-64.
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in question, most experts agree that negative
messages are more influential than positive
messages:
While there is room for argument about whether
negative ads will damage the political system
in the long term, there is no argument about their
short-term impact, they work and they win
elections. Voters pay attention to them (Ehrenhalt 1985, 2560).

Democratic pollster, Mark Mellman
explains the success of negative political ads
as follows:
One of the fundamental facts of psychology is
that negative information is processed more
deeply than positive information. People say
they hate the stuff, but that's not the point. The
point is, they absorb the information (cited in
Pfau and Kenski 1990, 3).

The sophistication of both the thematic
designs and the technology itself has added
to the effectiveness of negative ads:
More politicians, including incumbents, are
inclined to use negative and comparative message
strategies, partly because they know that some
consultants can demonstrate which messages
work and which don't, and partly because they
know that their opponent has the same strategic
opportunity and technology at his or her disposal
(pfau and Kenski 1990, 4).

The conclusion that negative political
advertising is more effective than positive
political advertising is rarely argued. However, negative ads could still have undesired
effects. Using negative advertising strategies
could be a "damned if you do and damned if
you don't" situation.
The Boomeran& Effect
One of the undesired effects of negative
political advertising that has been researched
and documented is the boomerang effect:

Negative political advertising may achieve its
intended effects, but it may also produce
boomerang effects. A strong attack on a
candidate, if perceived by the audience as
untruthful, undocumented, or in any way
unjustified, may create more negative feelings
toward the sponsor, rather than toward the target
(Garramore 1984, 251).

The 1990 race for Congress in Utah's
third congressional district may provide an
example of the boomerang effect. Since its
creation in the early 1980s, the third congressional district has maintained the reputation
of being one of the "nation's most Republican
congressional districts" (Barone and Ujifusa
1991, 1253). Election results from the past
decade substantiate that reputation. As shown
in Table 3, voters from Utah's third congressional district voted overwhelmingly in favor
of Republican Ronald Reagan over Democrat
Walter Mondale in the 1984 presidential
election and in favor of Republican George
Bush over Democrat Michael Dukakis in the
1988 presidential election (Barone and Ujifusa
1987, 1207; 1989, 1233).
Results of the past four congressional
elections prior to 1990 also show a heavy
domination by the Republican party. As
shown in Table 4, the smallest margin of
victory between Republicans and Democrats
in these races occurred in 1986 when Republican Howard Nielson received 67 percent
of the vote and Democrat Dale Gardiner
received 33 percent of the vote (Barone and
Ujifusa 1987, 1208). Nielson received 77
percent of the vote in 1982 and 75 percent of
the vote in 1984 (Barone and Ujifusa 1985,
1363). In 1988, Nielson received 67 percent
of the vote while his opponent, Democrat
Robert Stringham, received only 31 percent
of the vote. Election results like these led
experts to believe that the congressman elected
in 1990 to replace retiring Nielson would
"surely be chosen in the 1990 Republican
primary" (Barone and Ujifusa 1989, 1233).
Why then were the results so completely
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different in the 1990 race for Utah's third
congressional seat? Democrat Bill Orton beat
Republican Karl Snow by almost as large a
margin as the Republicans have been beating
the Democrats--Orton received 58 percent of
the vote while Snow only received 36 percent.
These results may be linked to the negativity
of the campaign.
Polls conducted by Bardsley and
Neidhardt Incorporated (of 300 registered
voters, margin of error + /- 5.7 %) and

reported in the Salt Lake Tribune November
4, 1990 showed Snow leading Orton in
September by 43 to 31 percent with 26 percent
undecided. By the middle of October, Snow
still led by 50 to 35 percent with 12 percent
undecided. But, by the first day of November
Snow's lead shrunk to 44 percent over 38
percent for Orton with 14 percent undecided--a
race too close to call.

TABLE 3
Vote for President in Utah's Third Congressional District
By Candidate's Political Party (General Election)

Party

Republican
Democratic

1984 Vote

1988 Vote

n

%

n

%

153,584
43,293

77
22

140,110
60,118

69
29

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1985. The
almanac of American politics: 1986. Washington D.C.: National Journal.
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The race was characterized as by far the most
negative campaign in the history of the district
and perhaps the most negative in the history
of Utah politics. Most attacks between Snow
and Orton occurred during October:
Neither candidate will emerge from the campaign
unwounded. Orton was questioned about tax
penalties he owed on a vehicle he brought to
Utah from Oregon years ago. Snow has been
plagued with allegations about

the depth of his involvement with penny-stock swindler
Michael Strand (Adams 1990, lB).

Despite the negative campaigning and
the fact that Snow's lead was dwindling, local
analysts still predicted the usual Republican
victory:
Snow [will winJ--not by an avalanche--but
comfortably, and Orton's political career is over
almost before it began. Scandal aside, it is the
most Republican district in the nation (Lythgoe
1990, IE).

TABLE 4
Utah's Third Congressional District Campaign Election Results 1982-1988
Election

Candidate

n

%

1982 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Henry Huish (D)

108,478
32,661

77
23

1984 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Bruce Baird (D)

138,918
46,560

75
25

1986 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Dale Gardiner (D)

86,599
42,582

67
33

1988 general

Howard Nielson (R)
Robert Stringham (D)

129,951
60,018

67
31

Source: Barone, Michael, and Grant Ujifusa. 1987. The Almanac ofAmerican Politics: 1988.
Washington D.C.: National Journal.
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During the last days of the campaign-two days before the election--supporters of
Snow added more fuel to the campaign's
negative fire. They placed an ad in the Utah
County J oumal showing a picture of Karl
Snow with his large family next to a picture
of Orton, who is single. Captions under the
respective pictures read "Karl Snow and his
Family" and "Bill Orton and His Family."
Some experts say Snow was "hurt" by the
placement of the ad (Barone and Ujifusa 1991,
1253). Orton himself said the ad backfired
on Snow:

People called saying they could not vote
Republican after seeing that ad. I think it was
a miscalculation on their part. They thought
that would destroy my campaign by alienating
me from the voters. It didn't work (Sait Lake
Tribune 1990, 2A).

That advertisement, along with the
negative nature of the campaign from the
beginning, may have led would-be Republican
voters to abandon their party loyalty and vote
for Orton.

Figure 4
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A comparison of the results in the 1990
third congressional elections to all the other
elections in the district's history alone would
seem to indicate the strength of the boomerang
hypothesis. However, an analysis of voters
who voted in the primary and general election
prove its existence even more solidly. As
shown in Figure 4, the 1990 KBYU/Utah
Colleges Exit Poll indicates that a large
percentage of those who say their vote was
a vote against the opponent voted for Orton.
Conversely, a much smaller percentage of
those who voted for Snow said their vote was
a vote against Orton .

The fact that 74 percent of those casting
protest votes--a vote against the opponent-were for Orton and against Snow indicates
a strong disapproval of Snow as a candidate.
There was also a substantial amount
of defections among those who voted for the
two Republican front runners (Snow and
Harmer) in the Republican primary election.
As shown in Figure 5, the 1990 KBYU/Utah
Colleges Exit Poll indicates that 33 percent
of those who voted for Karl Snow in the
primary voted for Orton in the general election
and 68 percent of those who voted
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Primary Votes in General Election
80
70

~ For Snow

II For Harmer
.::.::.::.:.::.::.:.::. Other:,/OK
,
II

(I)

S

~

~

«S

E

60

r~~r~~~~~~~

50

'1:
Q.

-

'0

40

c:

~

G)

30

Q.

20

10
0
Bill Orton
Karl Snow
3rd District General Election Votes

Source: 1990 KBYU/Utah Colleges Exit Poll.

Bolinder 55
for John Harmer in the primary voted for
Orton in the general election.
Although it may be difficult to show
a direct causal relationship between the Snow
family ad and the outcome of the general
election in the third congressional district, the
race has been characterized by two distinct
descriptions: the amount of negative campaigning was far greater than ever before and
the results were completely different than ever
before. Polls conducted before the placement
of the Snow family ad made no indication of
a landslide victory for Orton. The negative
tone of the campaign together with the Snow
family ad could have had the most effect on
those in the category of "undecided" in the
polls prior to election day and those who's
decisions were not solid.
A relationship does appear to exist
between the negative campaign in the third
district and the vote against Karl Snow.
However, too many limitations also exist to
use the race as definitive proof of the boomerang theory of negative political advertising.
Several other independent variables may have
affected the outcome of the election: the
negative tone of the Republican primary,
Republican party infighting, the personalities
of the two candidates, the platforms of the two
candidates, and the conservative views of
Orton despite his partisanship. Direct empirical research of voter reaction to negative
advertisements would need to be conducted
to prove the boomerang theory.
The timing of the Snow family ad could
also have been a big factor in the outcome of
the election. Based on their observations,
some professional consultants suggest the
following:

a wave of negative ads/ frequently reduces the
attacker's poll standing a few points. But those
numbers nearly always bounce back within a
few days. Meanwhile, the target of the attack
loses considerably more support--and that slippage lasts much longer (Johnson-Cartee and
Copeland 1991, 14).
,

There were not a "few days" to make up for
what may have been lost ground from the
placement of the Snow family ad.
Conclusions
Although their use has changed over
the course of our history, negative political
advertisements have always been a part of our
political system. This will probably remain
true in the future. The craft of developing
negative political advertisements--with their
many thematic designs and strategies--has
evolved into somewhat of a science. However,
determining the true effects of negative
political advertisements--or political advertisements in general--is still the greatest challenge
to political practitioners and communication
researchers.
Experts do agree that when it comes
to basic messages, which is the goal of most
political advertisements, a negative message
is usually remembered more than a positive
message. So as long as politicians feel the need
to advertise their candidacy, the use of
negative political advertisements will continue
and perhaps escalate. But, negative ads will
sometimes cause negative effects. What the
sponsor says about the opposing candidate,
if it is perceived to be untruthful or unfair,
could backfire on his or her own success in
a campaign.
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